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Abstract—Recent efforts towards industry 4.0 promote a digital
manufacturing (DM) paradigm that can enhance quality and
productivity, reduce inventory and the lead-time for delivering
custom, batch-of-one products based on achieving convergence of
3D printing and hybrid machine tools, Automation and Robotic
Systems, Sensors, Computing, and Communication Networks,
Artificial Intelligence, and Big Data. A DM system consists of
embedded electronics, sensors, actuators, control software, and
inter-connectivity to enable the machines and the components
within them to exchange data with other machines, components
therein, the plant operators, inventory managers, and customers.
This paper will outline the cybersecurity risks and threat vectors
in the emerging DM context, assess the impact on manufacturing,
and identify approaches to secure DM.
Index Terms—Digital Manufacturing
I. INTRODUCTION
D IGITALIZATION of manufacturing aided by advances insensors, artificial intelligence, robotics, and networking
technology, is revolutionizing the traditional manufacturing in-
dustry by rethinking manufacturing as a service. Concurrently,
there is a shift in demand from high volume manufacturing to
batches-of-one, custom manufacturing of products [1]. While
the large manufacturing enterprises can reallocate resources
and transform themselves to seize these opportunities, the
medium and small scale enterprises (MSEs) with limited
resources need to become federated and proactively deal
with digitalization. Many MSEs essentially consist of general-
purpose machines that give them the flexibility to execute a va-
riety of process plans and workflows to create one-off products
with complex shapes, textures, properties, and functionalities.
One way the MSEs can stay relevant in the next generation
digital manufacturing (DM) environment is to become fully
inter-connected with other MSEs by using the digital thread
and becoming part of a larger, cyber-manufacturing business
network [2]. This allows the MSEs to make their resources
visible to the market and continue to receive work orders1.
Digitization will also enhance compliance with the larger
industry and customers in terms of technology standards and
practices, and access resources and services available through
the inter-connected digital supply chain (DSN) network.
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In the emerging DM, timeliness of information is impor-
tant for lean production, as well as quality and productiv-
ity assurance. Digitization creates communication channels
across vendors and OEMs on one hand and between the
various machines inside an MSE on the other. DM requires
the integration of cyber (computing and communications)
resources with the physical resources in the manufacturing
process and supply chain. Continuous streaming of data from
sensors at various locations in the manufacturing plant (e.g.,
individual machines and the network of machines) informs the
data-driven decision making that guides design modifications,
calibrates manufacturing methods, and programs the robot
tasks and paths that they navigate the manufacturing floor.
Securing such a distributed and connected cyber-physical sys-
tem against cyberattacks requires developing novel approaches
that are tailored to the threats faced by such systems. The
cyberattacks can range from sabotage of product quality and
intellectual property theft to ransomware. The attack surface,
threat vectors, and solutions need to be analyzed to enable a
secure, resilient, and scalable next generation DM.
Traditionally, manufacturing plants have been siloed and
naturally create air gaps making them secure [3]. On one
hand, DM exploits the information from the various sensors
and devices to streamline the process and material flow. On
the other hand, the distributed and collaborative nature of DM
exposes it to risks that come with the connectivity required to
implement DM. A typical DM process workflow is illustrated
in Figure 1. A large part of the process before the actual manu-
facturing step is completely digital and relies on computational
resources and computer networks for design, simulation, and
programming the controllers of the manufacturing machines.
The DM system may consist of additive, subtractive, and
hybrid manufacturing machines. This process flow requires
connectivity throughout the process chain. However, connec-
tivity poses a security risk, which needs to be addressed by
traditional and novel cybersecurity solutions that are applicable
to various steps of the process flow. This paper is focused
on analyzing the cybersecurity risks, developing an attack
taxonomy and proposing novel solutions designed for the DM
cyber-physical system.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will present a
hybrid manufacturing cell, a building block of DM, and uses
it to discuss vulnerabilities. A taxonomy of threats for DM
and attack case studies are discussed in Section III. Section
IV will demonstrate how novel manufacturing-unique defenses
can mitigate the attacks. Section V discusses lessons learned
from state-of-the-art in DM security and research challenges.
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Fig. 1. A representative process workflow in digital manufacturing systems.
II. HYBRID MANUFACTURING CELL: A DM BASIC BLOCK
Hybrid manufacturing cells are a prime example of a DM
building block. Hybrid manufacturing combines traditional
and advanced manufacturing technologies with state-of-the-
art DM to work in tandem to produce the desired part. A
traditional manufacturing cell has resources to process and
produce parts efficiently and economically. Key components
of a hybrid manufacturing cell include classical manufacturing
machines retrofitted with sensors and connectivity, emerging
digitally-enabled manufacturing machines (e.g., additive, sub-
tractive and hybrid machines), autonomous robots, and quality-
control/inspection instrumentation.
Connectivity and computational infrastructure are key en-
ablers of hybrid manufacturing cells, and sets them apart
from a traditional manufacturing cell. Connectivity includes
the feedback loops within the machines based on the machine
state and feedback loops based on the observations of the
process from an observer external to the machine. It also refers
to the communication channels among the manufacturing
resources within the manufacturing cell. The computational
infrastructure supports data collection, storage, analysis, and
decision making elements of manufacturing. While connectiv-
ity and computational infrastructure improve the utilization of
the manufacturing resources, they can be attack vectors for
internal and external adversaries. Thus, vulnerable nodes in
these supporting infrastructures must be identified and secured
to realize the economic and efficiency benefits of DM. In the
following sub-sections we discuss applications of the hybrid
machine tools, describe key components in a cell, feedback
loops within a cell and the vulnerabilities.
A. Applications of Hybrid Machines
While metal additive manufacturing processes are costly and
inefficient for creating certain part features such as surface
texture, subtractive manufacturing processes are expensive for
certain designs because of the tooling and material costs. Hy-
brid machines bring synergy in these complementary processes
(by including both additive and subtractive manufacturing
capabilities within a single machine) especially for manufac-
turing custom components, resulting in reduced setup times,
material costs and error in handling. Hybrid machines satisfy
the quality and accuracy requirements for industrial applica-
tions [4] and are able to replace process chains spread across
multiple machines (possibly located at different enterprises) to
just a single machine, reducing any logistical inefficiencies.
Hybrid machines have been successfully used in re-
manufacturing and repair of high value components and in
manufacturing parts that require complex process chains. Pipe
casings for offshore oil extraction have several features (Boss,
Fins, Flange and Spiral coatings) on the surface critical for
the application. The use of a hybrid machine for such a part
was proven to reduce material cost by ∼97.2% in addition
to the tooling cost [5]. Dental implants are a three-part design
implant, abutment, and crown and are patient specific. Hybrid
machines are able to realize such a customization economi-
cally by milling the implant-abutment interface, followed by
additive manufacturing of the abutment portion designed for
the target patient [6]. Hybrid machines can create innovative
injection molds which provide improved cooling performance
over the traditional fabrication methods [7]. Other applications
of hybrid machines include surface patching in mold and die
repair [8] and turbine blade repair [9].
B. The Hybrid Machine Tool
Figure 2(a) illustrates a hybrid machine tool with its three
key elements the hybrid process element, the controller, and
the smart element. The hybrid process elements include the
milling tools, the coordinate measuring touch probe, grinding
tools, and the laser engineered net-shaping process that em-
ploys a directed energy deposition printing head. These tools
support consecutively running the additive and subtractive
manufacturing cycles within a process cycle. The control
element allows the user to interface with the hybrid process
element and the execution of process cycles. It acts as an
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Fig. 2. (a) Hybrid Machine Tool and constituent elements. Sensors shown include accelerometer, dynamometer, acoustic emission sensor and a high-speed
camera. (b) Data streams collected from the sensor wrapper of the smart element [10]
internal observer that observes the internal state of the machine
(e.g., position, feed rate, laser power, and spindle speed) and
sends actuation signals based on the instructions specified
by the operator. The smart elements include sensors (e.g.,
accelerometer, acoustic emission sensor, dynamometer, and
a high-speed camera) with supporting hardware. Hardware
and software that enable data acquisition from the sensors
are termed the sensor wrapper [11], [12]. The sensor wrapper
implementation is composed of high-resolution sensors, Data
Acquisition system (e.g, CompactDAQ from the National
Instruments), signal conditioning elements such as filters and
amplifiers (e.g., AE2A Amplifier from Mistras), and human
machine interface (e.g. LabView from National Instruments).
The sensors include the acoustics sensors (e.g., WSA wide-
band AE sensor from Physical Acoustics, accelerometer (e.g.,
K-Shear 8728A500 from Kisler) and a dynamometer (e.g.,
MFS15050 tri-axis dynamometer from CNIC Electric Co.).
The sensor wrapper also has high-speed camera (e.g, Mini
AX 200 high-speed camera from Photron). The sensor signals
allow the process states to be estimated for feedback control
[13] as well as for providing observations from the perspective
of an external observer (e.g., the operator) [14]. During the
process cycle, the sensors collect acceleration, force, acoustic
emissions and camera recordings of the process. The three
elements of the hybrid machine tool work in harmony to
enable refined control over the process. Such harmony is
possible due to the coordination among process hardware and
IoT devices in the computing and the communication channels.
C. Process Control Based on Feedback Loops
The hybrid machine tool can produce parts with complex
geometries and functionalities. These capabilities of the ma-
chine create complexities in the process cycles and allow
for faults to creep into the process. While process faults
are inevitable for any complex system, one needs to execute
corrective measures to mitigate the effects of these faults.
Monitoring the process as an external observer is therefore
essential in operating the hybrid machine tool. The hybrid
elements can allow the operator to take corrective actions when
a fault is observed. For example, a defect created in the part
during the additive manufacturing cycle can be undone by
executing a subtractive cycle over the layer with the defect
before resuming the additive cycle. Taking corrective measures
after a fault occurs leads to loss in manufacturing lead time
and the physical resources. The smart elements can intervene
to save time and resources by informing the operator about
an imminent fault. This is possible by using the information
that the sensor wrapper collects. Figure 2(b) illustrates the
time synchronized data stream for an additive manufacturing
cycle collected over 120 seconds. The Data stream for the
force signals are densely packed, therefore an adjacent plot
represents the force plot for a 0.05 second window. The
information generated from the sensor wrapper is voluminous.
Data is sampled at a rate of 100 KHz, 50 KHz and 10 KHz
for the acoustic emissions, the accelerometer, and the force
transducers, respectively. Each of these data streams over a
120 second period generate 89.5 MB, 44.7 MB and 8.92 MB
of data, respectively. The High-speed camera captures images
at a maximum of 1000 frames per second amounting to 110
GB over the 120 second period.
The controller (internal observer) observes and controls
the hybrid machine tool based on the machine state. The
external observer however, observes the process and takes
corrective measures. This establishes two feedback loops. The
controller sends actuation signals to the hybrid machine tool
based on instructions within the G-code (subject to change
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Fig. 3. Closed Loop control block diagram for the Hybrid Machine Tool.
based on the external observations of the process) that is
sent by the operator. The G-code is a file containing the
high-level instructions meant to be executed on the hybrid
machine. The operator may observe the information stream
and take corrective measures by sending new instructions
when the information stream resembles the nascent stages of
an imminent fault, thereby overcoming the fault altogether.
This is illustrated in Figure 3 as a closed loop controller.
The refined control over the process is thus achieved by
a feedback control that is based on both information on the
machine state and information about the process. The feedback
control entails collecting, processing, and analyzing volumi-
nous information to derive inferences about the process in real
time. This requires computing on large amounts of information
in a timely manner and may resort to AI methods to process
the information. This makes the need for computing infrastruc-
ture apparent. Factors influencing the computing infrastructure
include, the environment where computing happens, latency of
the computation, the type of data, and the amount of data.
In online quality control where the corrective and prognostic
measures are to be taken, information from the sensor is
processed in real time to infer about the state of the process
and therefore, data storage and computing resources must be in
the vicinity of the process to avoid latency. Another situation
for online quality control is where latency of the calculation is
not an issue, but there are no computational resources on the
shop floor. Then, the computational services offered by cloud
platforms are leveraged. For offline quality control, where a
defect in the part is identified later, the investigator may use
data collected during the process to identify process faults –
missed by online quality control– that may have led to a defect.
Thus, the computing infrastructure is dictated by the require-
ments of the manufacturing cell. Data storage, computations,
and transmission of the calculations to the destination are
essential to establish the closed loop control. Since manufac-
turing shop-floors may be limited in their capacity to cater to
such requirements efficiently, cloud computing infrastructure
could be economical and efficient. Cloud-based computing
infrastructure is mature and reliable for application in the
hybrid manufacturing cells. Cloud service providers (e.g.,
Amazon Web Services and Rackspace) have integrated the el-
ements of storage, computation and communication. Amazon
provides storage services (namely, the Elastic Block Store)
and hosts well-known services (R, Matlab, Mathematica) as
Virtual Machines (VMs) in the cloud. All computations can
be visualized on the cloud VMs with software like Tableau and
the workflow in the cloud orchestrated by scientific workflow
management software such as Kepler.
Figure 4 illustrates the cloud as being central to online
and offline quality control for the hybrid manufacturing cells.
Signals collected by the sensors from the plant are stored
in a local historian (storage for the data stream) and is
then uploaded to the cloud for storage. From this point, the
scientific workflow management software handles the flow of
data. The computing VM is activated to receive the data, to
analyze the data, and to calculate new control signal outputs,
which are downloaded onto the controller closing the loop. For
offline quality control, scanning electron microscopes and 3D
profilometers in the hybrid manufacturing cell inspect the part
after the process cycle. These instruments download process-
related data streams from the cloud storage and identify
anomalies in the process to explain defects in the part.
D. Vulnerabilities in a Hybrid Machine Tool
Although the hybrid machine tool is only one of the multiple
resources of a digital manufacturing process workflow, this
critical resource has multiple vulnerable nodes. Figure 5
summarizes eight vulnerable nodes in the closed loop control
diagram illustrated in Figure 3.
1) The first class of vulnerabilities can be used to manipulate
the instructions sent to the controller/plant. The adversary
can intervene at nodes 1 and 2. At node 1 the adversary
modifies the instruction (typically a G-code) sent by the
operator. The adversary may intervene at node 2 and
tamper with the actuation signal sent to the plant.
2) The second class of vulnerabilities is the replay attack.
At node 4, since the actuation signal is monitored, the
replay attack can trick the external observer into thinking
that the instructions are executed as per specifications.
3) The third class of vulnerabilities arise due to the feedback
loops. The internal observer (controller) and the external
observer use the machine state and process information
to send new instructions. The adversary may intervene at
node 3, 5 and 6 to relay false information on the machine
state and process resulting in erroneous feedback control.
This sabotages the process of online quality control.
Fig. 4. Cloud-based computing platform for a Hybrid Manufacturing Cell.
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Fig. 5. Vulnerable nodes in a Hybrid Machine Tool. The vulnerable nodes
are identified by a red star, indexed by a subscript.
4) The last class of vulnerabilities are identified at nodes
7 and 8. Node 7 corresponds to the side channel attacks
leading to IP theft. Node 8 represents an indirect sabotage
of the system in place due to counterfeit production.
The block H2(s) within the innermost feedback loop is
a transfer function block that estimates the machine state
(e.g., spindle speed, bed and tool position, laser power) based
on the measurements from built-in sensors, such as optical
scales and other motion trackers. The controller is continually
tracking the error between the reference signal (generated from
the interpretation of the instructions in the G-code) and the
feedback signal of the estimated machine state from the hybrid
machine tool. The reference signal specifies what the machine
state should be at any given point in time as per the instructions
in the G-code. The controller sends actuation signals (~u) to the
hybrid machine tool that nullifies this error and thus bringing
the machine state to the reference state. Injection attacks
performed at node 2, include false actuation signals that drive
the machine to undesirable states resulting in process faults.
In case of a Man-in-the-Middle attack (replay attack) carried
out at node 3, the transfer function block receives incorrect
observations (contrary to the actual observations made by
the optical scales within the machine) leading to a trail of
miscalculations of the estimate of the machine state, error and
therefore the actuation signal itself. Therefore, again resulting
in the machine being driven to undesirable states and thus
eventually faults in the process.
The block H1(s) in the outer feedback loop estimates the
state of the process, based on information from a sensor
wrapper [15] and generates new instruction sets as required.
Typically, the transfer functions tend to be nonlinear opera-
tors to fuse information on the nonlinear and nonstationary
dynamics underlying the measured signals to detect changes
for corrective actions [16] or anticipate anomalies for prgnos-
tication and anticipatory control [17]. The state of the process
is defined in terms of the thermo-mechanical state variables
that capture the process that determines transformation of the
geometry, morphology, and the microstructure of the part as
it is being realized, as well as the health of the machine and
its components. Information derived from the sensor wrapper
may include thermal history, acoustic emission, and vibrations.
The new set of instructions generated based on the estimated
process state include reduction of laser power for the DED
process if desired melt-pool geometry, thermal history and/or
micro structure are not realized, re-manufacturing of layers
due to part distortions, and stopping the machine for preventive
maintenance due to tool wear. Information on thermal history
can be used to predict part deformation during additive manu-
facturing cycles[18]. Vibration data in a grinding process can
predict surface quality[15]. Acoustic emission signals can be
used to predict the cutting conditions for orthogonal cutting
experiments [19]. Such applications of the sensory information
from the process allow for generation of prognosis-based
instructions to the controllers.
The outer feedback loop tracks the process and serves the
purpose of minimizing the process deviation and averting any
process anomaly. Attacks on the outer feedback loop have a
direct consequence on the inner feedback loop, since instruc-
tions generated by the outer feedback loop are direct inputs to
the inner feedback loop. Man-in-the-Middle attacks carried out
at nodes 4,5 or 6 yield incorrect process state estimations and
therefore wrong prognosis leading to generation of incorrect
instructions to the controller. Injection attacks at node 1 serve
the effect of controllers in the inner feedback loop tracking
reference signals generated from the adversarys instructions,
obviating the efforts of the prognosis-based instructions from
the external feedback loop.
Side channel attacks at node 7 involve adversaries monitor-
ing the footprint generated by the process. These footprints,
for example, can be captured using a microphone that col-
lects the acoustic sounds produced by the machine when in
operation [20] or by tapping into the sensor data and other
signals in the outer feedback loop. Adversaries that track these
footprints from un-monitored channels could reverse engineer
the product and create counterfeits which could find their way
into the supply chain of critical components. Although the
effect of a counterfeited product is not as pronounced in the
manufacturing of low volume, high-value customizable parts
as is the case where these hybrid machines are put to use,
existence of such threats cannot be overlooked. Counterfeit
products do not qualify the strict quality standards causing
devastation in critical applications. They also sabotage brand
reputation. Counterfeiting practices threaten the entire hybrid
machine tool that is meticulously put in place with its feedback
loops to ensure strict part quality and highlighted as node 8.
III. DIGITAL MANUFACTURING: TAXONOMY OF THREATS
Cyber-enablement and interconnectivty of digital supply
chain networks introduce threats including financial theft and
theft of IP. Some of the threats are unique to DM including
digitally printing dangerous or illegal components, stealing
competitor IP (e.g. the design files), modifying them and
manufacturing counterfeits or sub-standard components and
deny service by taking manufacturing plants or critical parts of
the manufacturing plants (e.g. printers) offline. The attackers
may have different motivations including (i) nation state
actors, (ii) organized criminals, (iii) politically, socially, or
ideologically motivated hacktivists, (iv) hackers with financial
gain or sabotage intent, (v) competitors, and (vi) malicious
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attack can be applied on each target. Also, the arrows from the green column to the blue column show how each component in DM systems can be protected
by countermeasures.
insiders. The motivation of the attacker, resources available,
and the damage caused in each category can be different and
should be a part of the threat analysis.
A. Taxonomy of threats
Figure 6 shows a taxonomy of attacks, attack goals, attack
targets and the countermeasures using the DM process chain in
Figure 1. It also shows how an attacker can choose their attack
methods based on their goals and targets. This taxonomy is
used to develop defenses presented in Figure 6. For example,
to prevent an attacker from tampering with the design files
(e.g., STL files), a defender can embed identification codes
in the design to physically authenticate the printed product.
If the design has been tampered with or reverse engineered,
the embedded code will be impacted, and therefore will not
match with the correct one.
According to this taxonomy, we classify recent related
works in Table I. We first classify the papers based on whether
they focus on attacks or defenses or both. Then the threat
models that they consider are identified. In the case that the
paper is a survey that covers a variety of threat models, we
will leave the threat model field blank. Lastly, we categorize
all papers based on the attack methods they presented or based
on the defenses. It is not surprising that most papers are
focused on presenting possible defenses. However, in order
to develop a defense scheme, the threat model that it targets
overwhelmingly indicates that sabotage is the main attack goal
and the attacks are launched either to tamper the files or for IP
theft. IP theft is a major concern in DM because the design of
hardware parts remains the same for many years, even decades.
Revision to the designs that have been in place for so long,
due to design theft becomes expensive and taxing exercise.
A related issue in manufacturing sector is that a legitimately
obtained part can be used to reverse engineer the part design
which is then used for unauthorized production leading to
IP theft. The deterrence in such cases lies in the production
method that cannot be easily copied or decoded. Although DoS
attacks are a major concern in financial and technology sectors,
they are not a major concern in the manufacturing sector.
This is because in many large manufacturing enterprises,
the manufacturing machines are maintained on a separate,
protected internal network, which is then securely connected
to the internet for software or firmware updates only under
supervision when the production activity is not taking place.
A growing concern is the manufacturing-unique side channels
(e.g., acoustics) and side channel attacks aided by machine
learning used to uncover patterns in data obtained from the
multiple sensing sources such as the acoustic, thermal, smart
power meter and security camera sensors.
The threats in our taxonomy apply to all type of manufactur-
ing machines including the hybrid machines. The complexity
of the hybrid machine tool opens up possibilities for attackers
to sabotage or steal secrets. Attackers can sabotage the prod-
ucts by tampering the control signals, or instructions (e.g.,
the G-Code) from the operators. Attackers can steal design
secrets from side channel leaks from the hybrid machine tool.
To explain the attacks and potential impact of the attacks on
various aspects of DM process chain, we present five case
studies shown as red rows in Table I.
B. Case Study 1 Dr0wned attack on AM [24]
Informed by taxonomy of Figure 6, the goal of this attack
was sabotage. The attack was conducted to reduce reliability of
the part, and the attack target was design files. This attack on a
3D printer deliberately introduced defects into the part during
printing [24]. The controller PC connected to the 3D printer
was compromised by exploiting an un-patched vulnerability in
WinRAR. The attack decreased the fatigue life of a quadcopter
propeller causing a mid-flight failure by manipulating the
part geometry (an example shown in Figure 7(b)). The attack
was executed in three stages: The attacker compromises the
Controller PC, developed a counterfeit design similar to the
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TABLE I
CATEGORIZATION OF DM SECURITY STUDIES. “DOS”, “REV. ENGG.”, “TAMPER”, “UNRELIABLE”, COV. CHANNEL” STAND FOR “DENIAL OF
SERVICE”, “REVERSE ENGINEERING”, “TAMPERING DATA”, “REDUCE RELIABILITY”, AND “COVERT CHANNEL”, RESPECTIVELY. RED ROWS ARE
ATTACK CASE STUDIES IN SECTION III. BLUE ROWS ARE DEFENSE CASE STUDIES IN SECTION IV.
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Gupta et al. [21] X X X X
Strurm et al. [22] X X X
Ranabhat et al. [23] X X X X
Belikovetsky et al. [24] X X X X X
Yampolskiy et al. [25] X X X
Wu et al. [26] X X X X X
Chhetri et al. [27] X X X X X
Desmit et al. [28] X X X X X
Chen et al. [29] X X X X
Elhabashya et al. [30] X X X X X
Moore et al. [31] X X X X X
Bracho et al. [32] X X X X
Graves et al. [33] X X X X
Yampolskiy et al. [34] X X X X X X
Chhetri et al. [35] X X X X X
Belikovetsky et al. [36] X X X X X
Chhetri et al. [37] X X X X
Baumann et al. [38] X X X X
Wu et al. [39] X X X X X
Gupta et al. [40] X X X X X X
Moore et al. [41] X X X X X
Tsoutsos et al. [10] X X X
Belikovetsky et al. [42] X X X X X X X
Zarreh et al. [43] X X X X X X
Miller et al. [44] X X X X X
Chaduvula et al. [45] X X X X
Raban et al. [46] X X X X X X
Chen et al. [47] X X X
Yu et al. [48] X X X
Hoffman et al. [49] X X X X
Abdulhameed et al. [50] X X X
Padmanabhan et al. [51] X X X
Prinsloo et al. [52] X X X X X X
Chhetri et al. [53] X X X
Calzado et al. [54] X X
Yampolskiy et al. [55] X X X
Ivanova et al. [56] X X
Bridges et al. [57] X X X X X
Holland et al. [58] X X
Chhetri et al. [59] X X X X
Wei et al. [60] X X X
Wu et al. [61] X X X
Vincent et al. [62] X X X X X X
Riel et al. [63] X X X X
Ren et al. [64] X X X X
He et al. [65] X X X X X
Wu et al. [66] X X X X X X
Fey et al. [67] X X X X
Elhabashy et al. [68] X X X
Slaughter et al. [69] X X X X X
Satchidanandan et al. [70] X X X
Satchidanandan et al. [71] X X X
Woollaston [72] X X X
INCIBE [73] X X X
Satchidanandan et al. [74] X X X
Behera et al. [75] X X X
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Fig. 7. (a) Two 3D printed propellers. One of is defective. (b) CAD model of the design. (c) Design is compromised at the joints causing in-service failure. [24]
original design, and replaced the original design file on the vic-
tims PC with the counterfeit design file with the manipulations
shown in Figure 7(c). A reverse shell backdoor was installed
on the PC, which was used to submit jobs to the 3D printer.
This allowed the malicious software to take over the 3-D
printer and execute commands by the hacker. According to our
taxonomy, a variety of defenses can be applied to this scenario.
Although the attacker exploited a software vulnerability, the
detection of sabotage was possible by more rigorous testing
of the part.
C. Case Study 2: Cyberattack on the Honda automotive
physical plant [72]
Honda’ Tokyo-based automotive production plant was
forced to go offline by the self-propagating malware Wan-
naCry impacting the production of about 1000 vehicles [72].
The WannaCry malware infected hundreds of thousands of
computers worldwide by exploiting vulnerabilities in un-
patched legacy systems [76]. The plant was shut down for
48 hours to recover operations and data, as both the ICS
and IT networks were impacted [72]. As shown in Figure 8
the ransomware got deployed in the plant computer network
using a backdoor in an older un-patched version of the
windows OS and then infected all systems in the network.
According to our taxonomy in Figure 6, the attacker in this
case launched a denial of service attack on the automotive
plant by infecting and tampering their controller computers in
the control network.
D. Case Study 3: Cyberattack on the physical power grid [73]
Attackers may want to sabotage DM machines by tempering
with their power supplies. Idaho National Laboratory demon-
strated Aurora Vulnerability, where a connected generator was
subjected to cyberattack on the control processors to open
and close the breakers out of sync [73]. This stressed the
mechanical systems inside the power generator, destabilizing
it and causing it to explode. This and other similar attacks can
damage the physical infrastructure in a manufacturing plant.
Nation-scale attacks have been launched on the Ukrainian
power grid leading to country-wide power outages affecting
230,000 citizens [77]. Three power distribution companies
were affected as a result of this coordinated cyberattack that
lasted for several hours. This attack exploited credentials and
infected the network and SCADA systems using phishing
emails with malware [77]. Absence of network monitoring
and rules for remote access led to this attack. Disruption
in the power supply even momentarily can damage the part
that is being manufactured and some of the damages may
go undetected because of their small size or location. As per
taxonomy Figure 6, these attacks have the goal of sabotaging
the product or the machine and the target can be any system
connected to the power supply, ranging from power grid and
smarts meter (side channels) to the printer power supply.
E. Case Study 4: Additive Manufacturing Firmware At-
tack [31]
Attackers may set their attack target to be the firmware
of 3D printer. If the firmware is compromised, attackers can
sabotage the system by either modifying the control or deny
the service of the machines. The attacker’s strategy is to exploit
the firmware in order to selectively affect the integrity of
printed artifacts; this approach is particularly effective in case
random sample testing is applied after the artifact is printed,
as it increases the chance of bypassing detection. Furthermore,
any intervention to the printer firmware (especially at the
bootloader level) can make the attack persistent.
There are different tactics an attacker can employ to infect
the printer firmware. Most 3D printers and hybrid manufac-
turing platforms support Internet connectivity to allow remote
management or troubleshooting from the manufacturer, as part
of a service-level agreement with the end-users. In this case,
attackers can exploit vulnerabilities in the network services
running on the printer and eventually escalate their privileges
on the printer. This privilege escalation can be exploited to
update the printer with infected firmware, in case signed
firmware updates are not supported. Another attack vector that
may be exploited, is the input file parser within the printer. In
cases where the firmware directly processes tool path input
files (e.g. G-code files), any input sanity vulnerability may
allow memory corruption and execution flow hijacking. In this
case, attackers can inject malicious routines through input files,
or reuse existing code within the firmware memory space.
As soon as an attacker has infected the printer firmware,
they can easily control the actuators of the printer (e.g.,
print head motors, extruder valves or laser operation). By
controlling these actuators in a judicious fashion, attackers can
inject physical property attacks [31]. Furthermore, attackers
can also perform a Denial of Service (DoS) attack to the printer
so that legitimate users can no longer use the 3D print service.
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Fig. 8. WannaCry cyberattack on the Honda automotive plant computer network [72]
.
F. Case Study 5: Dissolvable support material [40]
This attack is applicable to multihead/multimaterial printers,
where support material can be printed in addition to the build
material. Typically, the support material is dissolvable and as
soon as the part is printed, it is submerged into an oxidizer
(e.g., acid) to separate it from the build material. The attack
consists of maliciously replacing build material in the interior
of the 3D part with support material, allowing narrow channels
for oxidizer to enter inside. Then, as soon as the print is
complete and the solvent removes all support material, it
would also carve hollow spaces within the part, where original
build material was replaced. The effect of this attack is to
reduce the structural integrity of the part, since the internal
structure will no longer be solid. According to our taxonomy in
Figure 6, this attack is classified as sabotage on DM machine
in order to reduce the reliability of the products.
IV. DIGITAL MANUFACTURING: CYBERPHYSICAL
DEFENSES
This section presents five case studies of manufacturing-
unique defenses spanning watermarking of controllers used
in a range manufacturing settings, design obfuscation, part
identification and provenance checking using embedded codes,
authentication of designs in the signal processing domain,
and an epidemiological approach to manufacturing IoT device
security by leveraging their inherent diversity.
A. Securing Manufacturing Controllers via Dynamic Water-
marks[70], [71]
Manufacturing may be broadly subdivided into discrete
manufacturing and process manufacturing. Discrete manufac-
turing is concerned with manufacture or assembly of discrete
units. In contrast, in process industries, the production pro-
cesses are continuous and batches are indistinguishable [78].
Examples are manufacturing plants such as chemical refineries
and paper mills. The production process depends critically on
maintaining the compositions, temperatures, pressures, etc.,
of relevant chemical reactions, the levels of tanks, or flow
rates, etc. The regulation of all the required variables is done
Fig. 9. A manufacturing plant with some subverted nodes.
through a feedback control loop that senses the relevant output
variables and calculates what actuation commands to apply.
Therefore the sensors, actuators and control laws play a
critical role in the manufacturing process. The measurements
made by the sensors typically travel over a communication
network. The measurements may also be processed at nodes
in the network either for fusing information or for performing
computations to support the control law. The problem of cyber-
security arises since sensor measurements or other information
traveling over the communication network may be intercepted
en route and altered. It is also possible that in distributed
control systems, the sensors may be compromised to report
false measurements. Therefore, for securing the manufacturing
processes, it is critical to address the security of the overall
distributed control system. Figure 9 depicts a manufacturing
plant with some compromised nodes in the feedback loops.
One can unify all the cases via a simple abstraction where
just sensors are compromised, as indicated in Figure 10. Wher-
ever the corruption of the measurements may have taken place,
one can just suppose that the sensor has been compromised.
The resulting threat model is shown in Figure 11. One
or more sensors/communication/computational nodes in the
cyberphysical system may be compromised, as indicated in
Fig. 9. A compromised sensor node can report any false data
at any time, as shown in Fig. 11. We do not restrict the
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range of false-data attacks. With this abstraction in hand, it
is possible to develop an active defense based on the idea of
“dynamic watermarking” [74]. The basic idea is illustrated in
Figure 12. Consider the problem of verifying if a sensor is
being truthful in reporting its plant output measurements. The
actuation nodes superimpose a small secret random “excitation
signal” onto their nominal actuation command.
This secret excitation can be regarded as a form of “wa-
termarking” in the signal domain for the dynamical (control)
system and hence the name dynamic watermarking. This exci-
tation applied into the plant manifests itself in a transformed
way in the outputs of the plant – it is indelible just like a
watermark on a sheet of paper. The manner in which it is
transformed depends on the dynamics of the pathway from
the actuator to the particular output. In model-based control,
design engineers have a good model of this pathway. If a
sensor reports measurements that do not contain the trans-
formed watermark, then the actuator can deduce that the sensor
measurements have been compromised somewhere. One can
conclude that an attack is happening and act appropriately.
The tests to determine whether the sensor measurements
contain the appropriate watermark are statistical in nature.
They rely on the fact that noise is normally present in the
sensor measurements, and that the attacker cannot separate
this ambient noise from the superimposed private excitation
applied by the actuator. The statistical tests that can be
conducted in various scenarios are described in [74], [79]. To
illustrate the core of the idea, consider the following example.
Example: Consider a fully-observed linear scalar Gaussian
controlled dynamical system described by the equation:
x[t+ 1] = ax[t] + bu[t] + w[t],
where x[t] is the state of the system and u[t] is the control
input at time t. w[t] ∼ N (0, σ2w) is i.i.d. noise with a Gaussian
distribution. We suppose that a, b, σ2w are known to the control
system designer. Let z[t] be the measurement reported by the
sensor. A truthful sensor reports z[t] ≡ x[t], but a malicious
sensor reports z[t] 6≡ x[t]. We assume an arbitrary history-
dependent feedback control policy g is in place, so that the
control policy-specified input is unominal[t] = gt(zt), where
zt := (z[1], z[2], . . . , z[t]) denotes the reported measure-
ments up to time t. This results in a closed loop system,
x[t+1] = ax[t]+ bunominal[t]+w[t]. Suppose that the actuator
superimposes a Gaussian noise unknown to the sensor on its
Fig. 10. The abstraction of a manufacturing plant with compromised
sensors.
Fig. 11. The malicious behavior of sensor nodes.
control input: u[t] = unominal[t] + e[t], where e[t] ∼ N (0, σ2e)
is a “dynamic watermark.”. The true state therefore satisfies:
x[t+ 1]− ax[t]− bunominal[t] ∼ N(0, σ2w), and (1)
x[t+ 1]− ax[t] ∼ N(0, b2σ2e + σ2w). (2)
The intuition behind dynamic watermarking is that by super-
imposing the private excitation that is unknown to the sensor,
the actuator forces the sensor to report measurements that are
correlated with {e[t]}, lest it be exposed. In particular, for this
scalar system, the following two “Attack Detector Tests” can
be done by the actuator to detect if the sensor is malicious:
Attack Detector Test 1: Actuator checks if the reported se-
quence of measurements {z[t]} satisfies
limT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
t=0 (z[t+1]−az[t]−bunominal[t]−be[t])2 = σ2w.
Attack Detector Test 2: Actuator checks if the reported se-
quence of measurements {z[t]} satisfies
limT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
t=0 (z[t+1]−az[t]−bunominal[t])2 = b2σ2e+σ2w.
If the sensor is honest and reports truthful measurements
z[t] ≡ x[t], it passes both Tests. If either test fails, the actuator
can declare the presence of a malicious sensor in the system.
The more difficult question is: If the signal z[t] passes both
Fig. 12. Dynamic Watermarking: The Actuator Node i adds a
secret noise ei(t), called “watermark,” to the nominal control input
ui,nominal(t) that it is expected to apply given the reported sensor
measurements. It can disclose that it is adding a secret noise, and
it can also disclose the statistics of the watermark, but it does not
reveal the actual value of the random signal ei(t).
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Tests 1 and 2, then what guarantees can we provide on the
CPS? Rather strong guarantees can be provided if the signal
passes both Tests. Let v[t+1] := z[t+1]−az[t]−bunominal[t]−
be[t]−w[t]. It has the interpretation as the additive distortion
sequence introduced by the malicious sensors to the process
noise present in the system. If z[t] ≡ x[t], then v[t] ≡ 0.
Theorem 1 [74]: Suppose that the reported sequence of mea-
surements passes the two tests. limT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1 v
2[t] = 0.
That is, {v[t]} is a zero power signal.
It states that if the malicious sensors wish to remain undetected
by passing the above two tests employed by the actuators, then
the only attack that they can launch is to distort the process
noise present in the system by adding a zero power signal
to it. This in turn allows the dynamic watermarking method
to provide powerful guarantees on the overall closed-loop
performance of the Physical Plant even under attack. Suppose,
for example, that |a| < 1 and a closed-loop linear control law
has been designed to maintain stability, unominal[t] = fx[t] with
|a + bf | < 1, with the control gain g chosen to yield good
quadratic regulator performance.
Theorem 2 [74]: The malicious sensor cannot compromise
the mean-square performance if it is to remain undetected
through the above two Tests: limT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
t=0 x
2[t] =
(σ2w +B
2σ2e)/(1− |a+ bf |2).
System metrics such as the quadratic regulation cost cannot
be degraded by the malicious sensors, no matter what attack
strategy they employ, without being detected.
The dynamic watermarking is only designed to detect an
attack. What is to be done after an attack is detected depends
on the context. In some plants, one may be able to switch
to manual control. In others, one may be able to replace the
sensor, or reboot the system. Dynamic watermarking is an
active defense in which the actuators inject secret excitation
in order to monitor the system and detect any adversarial
presence. This idea was introduced in [80] to detect replay
attacks, and extended in [81] to detect other attacks. The
papers [74], [79], [82] develop detectors that provably detect
arbitrary attacks that introduce non-zero power distortion.
Dynamic Watermarking is a general methodology that can
apply in a variety of contexts. It has been implemented
in a laboratory process control system [83]. A laboratory
demonstration showing the efficacy of dynamic watermarking
in an automation transportation testbed [84] was followed by
an implementation on a real autonomous vehicle driven in
autonomous mode [85]. It holds potential to be deployed as
a general purpose attack detection strategy in digital and con-
tinuous manufacturing plants, and in IoT and manufacturing
systems with sensors and actuators.
B. Security of Design files: Obfuscating Designs [40]
One of the major concerns in the DM is to ensure the
security and authenticity of CAD files. These files are de-
signed to provide incredible capabilities and information to the
designers. For example, some design software programs save
the entire workflow as a feature tree that the designers can
use to conveniently recall a previous design step by a single
click. However, such capabilities are also major security risks
Fig. 13. The same CAD model of a gear shows different physical
geometry when it is sliced and printed on the 3D printer build plate
in the x-z and x-y orientations due to the presence of security features.
because these files can reveal not only the design but also the
entire design process. Hence, embedding security in the design
files may compromise some of the functionalities [86].
Recent studies have shown the possibility of embedding a
layer of security in the form of design features. These features
can be developed with design elements such as overlapping
surfaces, curvatures, and scaling functions. A part 3D printed
from the design file containing such security features will
appear to be different than the onscreen representation of the
geometry unless the security key is applied. An example of
such secure CAD file is shown in Figure 13, where a stolen
CAD file will print with a different gear geometry if the
file is not sliced and printed in the prescribed orientation. A
combination of slicing orientation, slicing resolution, printer
resolution and other manufacture-time processing parameters
can be used for designing such security features.
C. Securing Manufactured Parts by Embedding Codes[47]
Parts manufactured by subtractive or formative manufac-
turing rely on surface markings for identification or au-
thentication. Serial number, bar code, QR codes, and other
forms of identifications are stamped or embossed on the
parts. Additive manufacturing presents a unique possibility
of encoding information inside the part during manufacturing
because the part is printed layer by layer. Either conventional
or bespoke identification marks can be encoded in the product.
These internal markings can be read by imaging methods
such as tomography, radiography, and ultrasonic imaging.
We have demonstrated the possibility of embedding a QR
code inside the part [86]. The method of embedding the
internal identification codes depends on the AM technology.
For example, sintering temperature can be changed locally to
generate a feature that provides a different signature when the
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Fig. 14. Two QR codes are sliced into 300 parts each and embedded
as interpenetrating codes. The correct slicing will retain only the
authentic code. Incorrect slicing will retain points that will not
produce any scannable code.
product is subjected to tomography. Methods such as selective
laser sintering have a resolution of only a few microns so an
individual feature of such size is not a concern in terms of the
mechanical properties of the part. The method demonstrated
slices a larger QR code into hundreds of pixel sized parts.
These parts are spatially distributed in a large number of slices
of the part after the slicing operation. Each part is below the
critical size compromising the mechanical properties. Slicing
of the code into hundreds of parts also makes it difficult to
find the unique direction from which this would become a
scannable code. Such obfuscation schemes can be designed to
work in a number of ways. In one possibility, the sliced codes
can be oriented such that the code is present in the CAD/STL
files but slicing will remove it and produce a solid part without
a trace of the code in it.
Reverse engineered and reconstructed CAD files will not
have the code. Hence, the parts manufactured from these files
will also not have the codes. Further, the parts printed from
stolen CAD files will have the code and will allow identifying
the unauthorized counterfeit. In another embodiment, two
inter-penetrating codes can be designed such that slicing at
certain angles will remove one code with the remaining code
used for identification as shown in Figure 14 [86]. This
scheme will result in reverse engineered CAD files that do
not resemble the original ones.
D. Intellectual Property Protection by Fingerprinting in the
Acoustic Domain [75]
CAD files are used as inputs for 3D printers in AM methods.
These files are not designed for mere visualization of the part
design but are designed to manufacture the part. This poses
a limitation on encryption and compression methods that can
be applied to such files. Any algorithm that causes a loss of
information will not be useful for such application and only
lossless methods are required.
A novel encryption method is proposed where a lossless
algorithm converts the CAD files to frequency domain audio
files [75]. The frequency domain files are saved as a spectro-
gram, which is used to generate the fingerprints of the design
in the form of (time, frequency) pairs for the amplitude peaks.
These fingerprints can be used as an alternate modality for file
authentication at any step in the manufacturing process chain.
Figure 15 shows a CAD model of a wheel hub, which is
transformed into the frequency domain spectrogram. The red
dots in the spectrogram mark the fingerprints identified for
the model. The number of fingerprints depend on a designer
specified threshold level or automatically determined based
on the security level. If the entire spectrogram is saved or
the threshold level is low enough, the spectrogram can be
converted back to the CAD model without any distortion or
loss of geometry. Such spectrograms are sensitive to change in
the design file. Even changing a dimension to the limit of res-
olution of the CAD file will generate significant perturbations
in the fingerprints that can be detected.
E. Securing Manufacturing IoT Networks by Device Popula-
tion Diversity
The manufacturing industry is adopting Internet-of-Things
(IoT) devices at 40% annual growth rates for enhanced asset
management and increased productivity [87]. The proliferation
of IoT and other non-compute devices is increasing the diver-
sity of devices connected to the network in the next-generation
manufacturing system [88]. The number and diversity of
IoT devices is expected to grow over time as sensors and
controllers are deployed widely [89]–[95].
Due to the increasing diversity in IoT devices, their ease in
connecting to networks, weak default password configurations,
and general lack of ability to automatic upgrade of firmware,
they are an easy target for cyberattacks [96]–[100]. While
efforts to deal with vulnerability of a particular equipment or a
unit in manufacturing system has been reasonably addressed,
assuring cybersecurity in the presence of a diverse ”population
mix” of IoT sensors and other non-compute devices deployed
in the next-generation manufacturing plants or across the
enterprise has not received much attention.
As a proxy to studying the device population mix in a real
world manufacturing enterprise, we carried out a measurement
campaign of types of devices on a large-scale campus network
[95]. We carried out a census of devices connected to the
campus network, and classified them based on their function.
The results are shown in Figure 16(a). The devices connected
to the network included desktops, laptops, mobile phones,
VOIP phones, printers, TV displays, AV equipment, science
appliances, and building automation gear among others. While
Fig. 15. Lossless transformation of a wheel hub solid model from
CAD format to frequency domain spectrogram.
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Fig. 16. (a) Diversity in device population on a Network. (b) Printers with no passwords (c) Status of firmware updates on printers.
the importance of keeping the computing equipment patched
and up-to-date has for obvious reasons been recognized for
quite some time, only recently the security of non-compute IoT
devices has started receiving attention [101]. Our study showed
that over 71% of devices on the campus network are non-
compute. Among these, ∼59% of the printers on the network
had out-of-date firmware (see Figure 16(b)) and over half of
the printers had no password. In a manufacturing plant, the
percentage and diversity of non-compute devices is expected
to be higher.
Current network security approaches and tools are device
agnostic and ignore the diversity of the networked IoT devices.
However, not all the devices are created equal and not all
the devices are updated and maintained at the same level of
network hygiene. In the campus network that we studied, while
the computers are managed, patched, and secured by the IT
team, the printers are maintained by graduate students, the
VOIP phones are managed by the communications department,
and the building automation devices are maintained by the fa-
cilities department. This leads to inconsistencies in the hygiene
and health across devices. We advocate enhancing security
tools to consider the diversity of the device populations.
Public health experts and epidemiologists consider popula-
tion diversity and the differing impact of diseases on different
groups in keeping the population healthy. Similarly, we advo-
cate network security policies and mechanisms tailored to the
population of devices in the manufacturing network. This has
benefits over state-of-the-art device-agnostic approaches.
Dynamics of the device population has a significant impact
on virus/attack epidemics in the network. For example, the
Mirai attack targeted particular type of devices and networks
with these devices had more compromises. Knowing the local
device population allows one to mine CERT vulnerability
database [102], [103] to study vulnerabilities specific to the
network. The CERT database is a repository of known vul-
nerabilities characterized by anticipated criticality. We can
construct device population specific attack vulnerability pro-
files. Besides the CERT database, one could use internal
information to augment the network monitoring tools. For
example, a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) control-
ling a boiler may need to be more carefully monitored and
protected compared to a printer on the network. If additional
information about the devices is available, this can be factored
into allocation decisions on monitoring devices. Data from
our study on campus devices revealed that the firmware in
printers is not upgraded as frequently as in other devices (see
Fig. 16(c)). While this knowledge is beneficial in deploying
IT resources for updating/patching the device firmware to
reduce the number of un-patched vulnerabilities, until that time
these devices2 are upgraded, extra resources maybe needed to
monitor them.
It is important to study the vulnerabilities of the network
device population and take steps to protect local device pop-
ulations. Following are at least three ways.
1) Based on the number of local devices and the known
vulnerabilities on these devices, network monitoring tools
and resources can be optimally apportioned to maximize
their effectiveness in detecting and containing the attacks.
At the time of connection, the level of provided network
service can be tailored to the known security vulnerabil-
ities of the device requesting network service. The levels
of service could include complete detail of service, lim-
ited access through security perimeters, requiring security
patches or upgrades before full access could be provided
etc. These approaches apply one device at a time at the
time of connecting to the network.
2) Isolate similarly vulnerable devices on a Virtual LAN
(VLAN) to provide suitable security for these devices.
For example, the Windows8 devices for which no new
security patches will be available could be isolated in a
separate VLAN and protect them with a security device
that carefully monitors Windows8 specific attacks. Simi-
larly, IoT devices in a critical infrastructure could be put
on a separate VLAN that only trusted users can access.
Even if they are not perfect, such population specific
isolation and protections will improve security.
3) Given the device population, network monitoring tools
can aggregate anomalies based on device types to find
patterns of attacks on specific types of devices. More
information can be gleaned by aggregation based on
device type. Observed anomalies can be checked against
vulnerabilities in the CERT database to find attack vec-
tors.
V. CONCLUSION
Adoption of DM requires companies to migrate to a Digital
Supply Chain Network (DSN) as shown in Figure 17. The
figure visually represents how a classical linear supply chain
2 e.g., devices with older firmware or vulnerabilities from CERT database.
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Fig. 17. The emerging digital supply chain network.
collapses into a set of dynamic networks due to digitalization.
DSNs enabled by networking within and across organizations
are integral to the DM. While integration of the social media
may be a counter-intuitive component in the DSN, companies
are adopting social media platforms to report service outages
and system malfunctions and to provide customer support.
As our study shows, the elements of the DM process chain
open up a large attack surface and introduce numerous vul-
nerabilities making them susceptible to traditional cyberattacks
and attacks that impact the physical plant and the quality of
the manufactured products. The digital integration spanning
the entire supply chain while making the production and
movement of goods efficient, increases the attack surface and
introduces new attack vectors.
Not all participants in a manufacturing supply chain may
have the same level of resources to implement the most
advanced defenses. The weakest links in a supply chain may
besides compromising their own assets, may compromise the
assets of all participants in the supply chain. This is especially
true for the MSEs, who have limited resources, nevertheless
have to embrace adoption of digital manufacturing. When the
MSEs employ the digital thread as part of setting up the DM
workflow and use the DSN to establish connectivity within
their enterprise and across enterprises in the supply chain,
they have to tackle the threats on all these multiple levels. The
challenge for these MSEs is therefore to be judicious in using
the limited resources to address these multi-level threats. The
MSEs must prioritize which cybersecurity issues to address as
they transition to a DM workflow.
While this study focused on cybersecurity of manufacturing-
unique elements of DSN other elements such as the informa-
tion, financial, and business networks are equally important.
Some of these elements can be secured using well-known
information security approaches such as encrypting data and
communication. Side channel attacks and reverse engineering
of products are threats that extend beyond the DM network
and impact a company significantly. Reverse engineering of
a product can lead to revenue loss, where the CAD models
may be generated by skillful designers based on an actual part
acquired from the OEM without any disruption or breaches to
the connected supply chain. These additional risks need to be
addressed when securing DM. Most IOT or DM technology
components lack sufficient device activity logging capability.
Insecure network protocols are typically used to connect DM
components to the internet. Various methods can be used to
assess the security posture of a manufactured product. Tra-
ditional systems have typically either been designed without
security in mind, or with the explicit presumption that the
system is isolated and so not subject to cyberattacks [3]. The
new generation of manufacturing sectors resulting from the
adoption of the DM process workflow and migrating to the
DSN would need special focus on securing complex systems
that are integrated within the control network in the manu-
facturing plant. Hence, security controls should be designed
from the inception of software development or hardware
configuration in the control network.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The NYU team acknowledges the National Science Foun-
dation Cyber-Physical Systems grant CMMI-1932264 and
NSF grant DGE-1931724. Bukkapatnam’s research is par-
tially supported by the Natioanal Science Foundation grants
CMMI-1432914 and S&AS INT-1849085, and Texas A&M
University’s x-grants program. Reddys research is supported
by Qatar National Research Foundation grant 9-069-1-018.
The material by Kumar is based upon work partially sup-
ported by NSF Science & Technology Center Grant CCF-
0939370, the U.S. Army Research Office under Contract No.
W911NF-18-10331, the U.S. Army Research Office under
Cooperative Agreement Number W911NF-19-2-0243, he U.S.
Army Research Laboratory under Contract No. W911NF-19-
2-0033 U.S. ONR under Contract No. N00014-18-1-2048,
and the Department of Energy. The views and conclusions
contained in this document are those of the authors and
should not be interpreted as representing the official policies,
either expressed or implied, of the Army Research Office
or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government is authorized
to reproduce and distribute reprints for Government purposes
notwithstanding any copyright notation herein.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Y. Zhong, X. Xu, E. Klotz, and S. T. Newman, “Intelligent
manufacturing in the context of industry 4.0: a review,” Engineering,
vol. 3, no. 5, pp. 616–630, 2017.
[2] A. S. Iquebal, Z. Wang, W.-H. Ko, Z. Wang, P. Kumar, A. Srinivasa,
and S. T. Bukkapatnam, “Towards realizing cybermanufacturing kiosks:
quality assurance challenges and opportunities,” Procedia Manufactur-
ing, vol. 26, pp. 1296–1306, 2018.
[3] N. Tuptuk and S. Hailes, “Security of smart manufacturing systems,”
Journal of manufacturing systems, vol. 47, pp. 93–106, 2018.
[4] M. Praniewicz, T. Kurfess, and C. Saldana, “Adaptive
geometry transformation and repair for hybrid manufactur-
ing,” Procedia Manufacturing, vol. 26, pp. 228 – 236,
2018, 46th SME North American Manufacturing Research
Conference, NAMRC 46, Texas, USA. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2351978918307017
[5] T. Yamazaki, “Development of a hybrid multi-tasking machine
tool: Integration of additive manufacturing technology with cnc
machining,” Procedia CIRP, vol. 42, pp. 81 – 86, 2016, 18th
CIRP Conference on Electro Physical and Chemical Machining
(ISEM XVIII). [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S2212827116004777
[6] D. Alter, “3d hybrid printing and implant-supported
prosthetics,” https://www.aegisdentalnetwork.com/idt/2018/06/
3d-hybrid-printing-and-implant-supported-prosthetics, 2018, online;
Last accessed the website in May 2020.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 15
[7] M. Soshi, J. Ring, C. Young, Y. Oda, and M. Mori, “Innovative grid
molding and cooling using an additive and subtractive hybrid cnc
machine tool,” CIRP Annals, vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 401 – 404, 2017.
[Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0007850617300938
[8] L. Ren, A. P. Padathu, J. Ruan, T. Sparks, and F. W. Liou, “Three
dimensional die repair using a hybrid manufacturing system,” in
Proceedings of the 17th Solid Freeform Fabrication Symposium, Austin,
TX, USA, 2006, pp. 14–16.
[9] P. Zelinski, “3d hybrid printing and implant-supported prosthetics,”
shorturl.at/rvFHZ, 2017, online; Last accessed the website in May
2020.
[10] N. G. Tsoutsos, H. Gamil, and M. Maniatakos, “Secure 3d printing:
Reconstructing and validating solid geometries using toolpath reverse
engineering,” in Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Workshop on cyber-
physical system security, 2017, pp. 15–20.
[11] B. Botcha, Z. Wang, S. Rajan, N. Gautam, S. T. Bukkapatnam, A. Man-
thanwar, M. Scott, D. Schneider, and P. Korambath, “Implementing
the transformation of discrete part manufacturing systems into smart
manufacturing platforms,” in ASME 2018 13th International Manufac-
turing Science and Engineering Conference. American Society of
Mechanical Engineers Digital Collection, 2018.
[12] A. S. Iquebal, B. Botcha, and S. Bukkapatnam, “Towards rapid,
in situ characterization for materials-on-demand manufacturing,”
Manufacturing Letters, vol. 23, pp. 29 – 33, 2020. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2213846319300951
[13] P. Rao, S. Bukkapatnam, O. Beyca, Z. J. Kong, and R. Komanduri,
“Real-time identification of incipient surface morphology variations in
ultraprecision machining process,” Journal of Manufacturing Science
and Engineering, vol. 136, no. 2, 2014.
[14] R. Palanna, S. Bukkapatnam, and F. S. Settles, “Model-based tampering
for improved process performancean application to grinding of shafts,”
Journal of Manufacturing Processes, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 24–32, 2003.
[15] B. Botcha, V. Rajagopal, R. B. N], and S. T. Bukkapatnam,
“Process-machine interactions and a multi-sensor fusion approach to
predict surface roughness in cylindrical plunge grinding process,”
Procedia Manufacturing, vol. 26, pp. 700 – 711, 2018, 46th
SME North American Manufacturing Research Conference, NAMRC
46, Texas, USA. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S2351978918307510
[16] A. S. Iquebal and S. Bukkapatnam, “Change detection and prognostics
for transient real-world processes using streaming data,” in Recent
Advances in Optimization and Modeling of Contemporary Problems.
INFORMS, 2018, pp. 279–315.
[17] C. Cheng, A. Sa-Ngasoongsong, O. Beyca, T. Le, H. Yang, Z. Kong,
and S. T. Bukkapatnam, “Time series forecasting for nonlinear and
non-stationary processes: A review and comparative study,” Iie Trans-
actions, vol. 47, no. 10, pp. 1053–1071, 2015.
[18] M. R. Yavari, K. D. Cole, and P. Rao, “Thermal Modeling in
Metal Additive Manufacturing Using Graph Theory,” Journal of
Manufacturing Science and Engineering, vol. 141, no. 7, 05 2019,
071007. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1115/1.4043648
[19] Z. Wang, F. Chegdani, N. Yalamarti, B. Takabi, B. Tai, M. El Mansori,
and S. Bukkapatnam, “Acoustic Emission Characterization of Natural
Fiber Reinforced Plastic Composite Machining Using a Random
Forest Machine Learning Model,” Journal of Manufacturing Science
and Engineering, vol. 142, no. 3, 01 2020, 031003. [Online].
Available: https://doi.org/10.1115/1.4045945
[20] M. A. Al Faruque, S. R. Chhetri, A. Canedo, and J. Wan, “Acoustic
side-channel attacks on additive manufacturing systems,” in 2016
ACM/IEEE 7th International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems
(ICCPS), 2016, pp. 1–10.
[21] N. Gupta, A. Tiwari, S. T. Bukkapatnam, and R. Karri, “Additive
manufacturing cyber-physical system: Supply chain cybersecurity and
risks,” IEEE Access, vol. 8, pp. 47 322–47 333, 2020.
[22] L. D. Sturm, C. B. Williams, J. A. Camelio, J. White, and R. Parker,
“Cyber-physical vulnerabilities in additive manufacturing systems: A
case study attack on the. stl file with human subjects,” Journal of
Manufacturing Systems, vol. 44, pp. 154–164, 2017.
[23] B. Ranabhat, J. Clements, J. Gatlin, K.-T. Hsiao, and M. Yampolskiy,
“Optimal sabotage attack on composite material parts,” International
Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, vol. 26, p. 100301, 2019.
[24] S. Belikovetsky, M. Yampolskiy, J. Toh, J. Gatlin, and Y. Elovici,
“dr0wned–cyber-physical attack with additive manufacturing,” in 11th
{USENIX} Workshop on Offensive Technologies ({WOOT} 17), 2017.
[25] M. Yampolskiy, A. Skjellum, M. Kretzschmar, R. A. Overfelt, K. R.
Sloan, and A. Yasinsac, “Using 3d printers as weapons,” International
Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, vol. 14, pp. 58–71, 2016.
[26] M. Wu, Z. Song, and Y. B. Moon, “Detecting cyber-physical attacks in
cybermanufacturing systems with machine learning methods,” Journal
of intelligent manufacturing, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 1111–1123, 2019.
[27] S. R. Chhetri, A. Canedo, and M. A. Al Faruque, “Kcad: kinetic cyber-
attack detection method for cyber-physical additive manufacturing
systems,” in 2016 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-
Aided Design (ICCAD). IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–8.
[28] Z. DeSmit, A. E. Elhabashy, L. J. Wells, and J. A. Camelio, “Cyber-
physical vulnerability assessment in manufacturing systems,” Procedia
Manufacturing, vol. 5, pp. 1060–1074, 2016.
[29] F. Chen, G. Mac, and N. Gupta, “Security features embedded in
computer aided design (cad) solid models for additive manufacturing,”
Materials & Design, vol. 128, pp. 182–194, 2017.
[30] A. E. Elhabashya, L. J. Wellsb, and J. A. Camelioc, “Cyber-physical
security research efforts in manufacturing–a literature,” Procedia Man-
ufacturing, vol. 34, pp. 921–931, 2019.
[31] S. B. Moore, W. B. Glisson, and M. Yampolskiy, “Implications
of malicious 3d printer firmware,” in 50th Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences, HICSS 2017, Hilton Waikoloa Village,
Hawaii, USA, January 4-7, 2017, T. Bui, Ed. ScholarSpace / AIS
Electronic Library (AISeL), 2017, pp. 1–10. [Online]. Available:
http://hdl.handle.net/10125/41899
[32] A. Bracho, C. Saygin, H. Wan, Y. Lee, and A. Zarreh, “A simulation-
based platform for assessing the impact of cyber-threats on smart
manufacturing systems,” Procedia Manufacturing, vol. 26, pp. 1116–
1127, 2018.
[33] L. M. Graves, J. Lubell, W. King, and M. Yampolskiy, “Characteristic
aspects of additive manufacturing security from security awareness
perspectives,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 103 833–103 853, 2019.
[34] M. Yampolskiy, T. R. Andel, J. T. McDonald, W. B. Glisson, and
A. Yasinsac, “Intellectual property protection in additive layer manu-
facturing: Requirements for secure outsourcing,” in Proceedings of the
4th Program Protection and Reverse Engineering Workshop, 2014, pp.
1–9.
[35] S. R. Chhetri, N. Rashid, S. Faezi, and M. A. Al Faruque, “Security
trends and advances in manufacturing systems in the era of industry
4.0,” in 2017 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided
Design (ICCAD). IEEE, 2017, pp. 1039–1046.
[36] S. Belikovetsky, Y. Solewicz, M. Yampolskiy, J. Toh, and Y. Elovici,
“Detecting cyber-physical attacks in additive manufacturing using
digital audio signing,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.06454, 2017.
[37] S. R. Chhetri and M. A. Al Faruque, “Side channels of cyber-physical
systems: Case study in additive manufacturing,” IEEE Design & Test,
vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 18–25, 2017.
[38] F. W. Baumann and D. Roller, “Additive manufacturing, cloud-based
3d printing and associated servicesoverview,” Journal of Manufacturing
and Materials Processing, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 15, 2017.
[39] D. Wu, A. Ren, W. Zhang, F. Fan, P. Liu, X. Fu, and J. Terpenny,
“Cybersecurity for digital manufacturing,” Journal of manufacturing
systems, vol. 48, pp. 3–12, 2018.
[40] N. Gupta, F. Chen, N. G. Tsoutsos, and M. Maniatakos, “Obfuscade:
Obfuscating additive manufacturing cad models against counterfeiting,”
in Proceedings of the 54th Annual Design Automation Conference
2017, 2017, pp. 1–6.
[41] S. B. Moore, J. Gatlin, S. Belikovetsky, M. Yampolskiy, W. E.
King, and Y. Elovici, “Power consumption-based detection of sabotage
attacks in additive manufacturing,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.01822,
2017.
[42] S. Belikovetsky, Y. A. Solewicz, M. Yampolskiy, J. Toh, and Y. Elovici,
“Digital audio signature for 3d printing integrity,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 1127–1141,
2018.
[43] A. Zarreh, C. Saygin, H. Wan, Y. Lee, A. Bracho et al., “Cybersecurity
analysis of smart manufacturing system using game theory approach
and quantal response equilibrium,” Procedia manufacturing, vol. 17,
pp. 1001–1008, 2018.
[44] D. B. Miller, W. B. Glisson, M. Yampolskiy, and K.-K. R. Choo,
“Identifying 3d printer residual data via open-source documentation,”
Computers & Security, vol. 75, pp. 10–23, 2018.
[45] S. C. Chaduvula, A. Dachowicz, M. J. Atallah, and J. H. Panchal,
“Security in cyber-enabled design and manufacturing: A survey,”
Journal of Computing and Information Science in Engineering, vol. 18,
no. 4, 2018.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 16
[46] Y. Raban and A. Hauptman, “Foresight of cyber security threat drivers
and affecting technologies,” foresight, 2018.
[47] F. Chen, Y. Luo, N. G. Tsoutsos, M. Maniatakos, K. Shahin, and
N. Gupta, “Embedding tracking codes in additive manufactured parts
for product authentication,” Advanced Engineering Materials, vol. 21,
no. 4, p. 1800495, 2019.
[48] S.-Y. Yu, A. V. Malawade, S. R. Chhetri, and M. A. Al Faruque,
“Sabotage attack detection for additive manufacturing systems,” IEEE
Access, vol. 8, pp. 27 218–27 231, 2020.
[49] W. Hoffman and T. A. Volpe, “Internet of nuclear things: Managing the
proliferation risks of 3-d printing technology,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 102–113, 2018.
[50] O. Abdulhameed, A. Al-Ahmari, W. Ameen, and S. H. Mian, “Additive
manufacturing: Challenges, trends, and applications,” Advances in
Mechanical Engineering, vol. 11, no. 2, p. 1687814018822880, 2019.
[51] A. Padmanabhan and J. Zhang, “Cybersecurity risks and mitigation
strategies in additive manufacturing,” Progress in Additive Manufac-
turing, vol. 3, no. 1-2, pp. 87–93, 2018.
[52] J. Prinsloo, S. Sinha, and B. von Solms, “A review of industry 4.0
manufacturing process security risks,” Applied Sciences, vol. 9, no. 23,
p. 5105, 2019.
[53] S. R. Chhetri, A. Barua, S. Faezi, F. Regazzoni, A. Canedo, and M. A.
Al Faruque, “Tool of spies: Leaking your ip by altering the 3d printer
compiler,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing,
2019.
[54] M. Jime´nez, L. Romero, I. A. Domı´nguez, M. d. M. Espinosa, and
M. Domı´nguez, “Additive manufacturing technologies: An overview
about 3d printing methods and future prospects,” Complexity, vol. 2019,
2019.
[55] M. Yampolskiy, L. Schutzle, U. Vaidya, and A. Yasinsac, “Security
challenges of additive manufacturing with metals and alloys,” in Inter-
national Conference on Critical Infrastructure Protection. Springer,
2015, pp. 169–183.
[56] O. Ivanova, A. Elliott, T. Campbell, and C. Williams, “Unclonable
security features for additive manufacturing,” Additive Manufacturing,
vol. 1, pp. 24–31, 2014.
[57] S. M. Bridges, K. Keiser, N. Sissom, and S. J. Graves, “Cyber security
for additive manufacturing,” in Proceedings of the 10th Annual Cyber
and Information Security Research Conference, 2015, pp. 1–3.
[58] M. Holland, C. Nigischer, and J. Stjepandic, “Copyright protection in
additive manufacturing with blockchain approach,” Transdisciplinary
Engineering: A Paradigm Shift, vol. 5, pp. 914–921, 2017.
[59] S. Chhetri, S. Faezi, A. Canedo, and M. Al Faruque, “Poster abstract:
Thermal side-channel forensics in additive manufacturing systems,” in
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Cyber-Physical
Systems, Vienna, Austria, Apr, 2016, pp. 11–14.
[60] C. Wei, Z. Sun, Y. Huang, and L. Li, “Embedding anti-counterfeiting
features in metallic components via multiple material additive manu-
facturing,” Additive Manufacturing, vol. 24, pp. 1–12, 2018.
[61] M. Wu, H. Zhou, L. L. Lin, B. Silva, Z. Song, J. Cheung, and
Y. Moon, “Detecting attacks in cybermanufacturing systems: Additive
manufacturing example,” in MATEC Web of Conferences, vol. 108.
EDP Sciences, 2017, p. 06005.
[62] H. Vincent, L. Wells, P. Tarazaga, and J. Camelio, “Trojan detection
and side-channel analyses for cyber-security in cyber-physical manu-
facturing systems,” Procedia Manufacturing, vol. 1, pp. 77–85, 2015.
[63] A. Riel, C. Kreiner, G. Macher, and R. Messnarz, “Integrated design
for tackling safety and security challenges of smart products and digital
manufacturing,” CIRP annals, vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 177–180, 2017.
[64] A. Ren, D. Wu, W. Zhang, J. Terpenny, and P. Liu, “Cyber security
in smart manufacturing: survey and challenges,” in IIE Annual Con-
ference. Proceedings. Institute of Industrial and Systems Engineers
(IISE), 2017, pp. 716–721.
[65] H. He, C. Maple, T. Watson, A. Tiwari, J. Mehnen, Y. Jin, and
B. Gabrys, “The security challenges in the iot enabled cyber-physical
systems and opportunities for evolutionary computing & other compu-
tational intelligence,” in 2016 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Com-
putation (CEC). IEEE, 2016, pp. 1015–1021.
[66] M. Wu, J. Song, L. W. L. Lin, N. Aurelle, Y. Liu, B. Ding, Z. Song,
and Y. B. Moon, “Establishment of intrusion detection testbed for
cybermanufacturing systems,” Procedia Manufacturing, vol. 26, pp.
1053–1064, 2018.
[67] M. Fey, 3D printing and international security: risks and challenges
of an emerging technology. DEU, 2017, vol. 144.
[68] A. E. Elhabashy, L. J. Wells, J. A. Camelio, and W. H. Woodall,
“A cyber-physical attack taxonomy for production systems: a quality
control perspective,” Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing, vol. 30,
no. 6, pp. 2489–2504, 2019.
[69] A. Slaughter, M. Yampolskiy, M. Matthews, W. E. King, G. Guss, and
Y. Elovici, “How to ensure bad quality in metal additive manufac-
turing: In-situ infrared thermography from the security perspective,”
in Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Availability,
Reliability and Security, 2017, pp. 1–10.
[70] B. Satchidanandan and P. R. Kumar, “Secure control of networked
cyber-physical systems,” in 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision
and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2016, pp. 283–289.
[71] B. Satchidanandan and P. Kumar, “Control systems under attack: The
securable and unsecurable subspaces of a linear stochastic system,”
in Emerging Applications of Control and Systems Theory. Springer,
2018, pp. 217–228.
[72] V. WOOLLASTON, “Wannacry is back! virus hits australian traffic
cameras and shuts down a honda plant in japan,” https://www.wired.
co.uk/article/nhs-cyberattack-ransomware-security, 2017, online; Last
accessed the website in May 2020.
[73] INCIBE, “Aurora vulnerability: origin, explanation
and solutions,” https://www.incibe-cert.es/en/blog/
aurora-vulnerability-origin-explanation-and-solutions, 2019, online;
Last accessed the website in May 2020.
[74] Bharadwaj Satchidanandan and P. R. Kumar, “Dynamic watermarking:
Active defense of networked cyberphysical systems,” Proceedings of
the IEEE, vol. 105, no. 2, pp. 219–240, Feb 2017.
[75] R. K. Behera, S. Sivaprakasam, L. N. Jagannathan, and N. Gupta,
“System and method for security and management of computer-aided
designs,” 2019, uS Patent 16/657,048.
[76] Kaspersky, “What is wannacry ransomware?” https://usa.kaspersky.
com/resource-center/threats/ransomware-wannacry, online; Last ac-
cessed the website in May 2020.
[77] D. U. Case, “Analysis of the cyber attack on the ukrainian power grid,”
Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC), vol.
388, 2016.
[78] T. Boissonneault, “”institute of Industrial & Systems Engineers: Pro-
cess Industries Division”,” https://www.iise.org/details.aspx?id=887,
2019, online; Last accessed the website in May 2020.
[79] Bharadwaj Satchidanandan and P. R. Kumar, “On minimal tests of
sensor veracity for dynamic watermarking-based defense of cyber-
physical systems,” in Proceedings of 2017 9th International Conference
on Communication Systems and Networks (COMSNETS). IEEE, 2017,
pp. 23–30.
[80] Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli, “Secure Control Against Replay Attacks,” in
Proceedings of the 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communica-
tion, Control, and Computing, Sept 2009.
[81] S. Weerakkody, Y. Mo, and B. Sinopoli, “Detecting Integrity Attacks on
Control Systems using Robust Physical Watermarking,” in Proceedings
of the 53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Dec 2014, pp.
3757–3764.
[82] Bharadwaj Satchidanandan and P. R. Kumar, “Secure control of net-
worked cyber-physical systems,” in Proceedimgs of the 2016 IEEE 55th
Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2016, pp. 283–289.
[83] Jaewon Kim, Woo-Hyun Ko and P. R. Kumar, “Cyber-security with
dynamic watermarking for process control systems,” in 2019 AIChE
Annual Meeting. AIChE, 2019.
[84] Bharadwaj Satchidanandan and P. R. Kumar, “Theory and imple-
mentation of dynamic watermarking for cybersecurity of advanced
transportation systems,” in Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE Conference
on Communications and Network Security (CNS), Oct 2016, pp. 416–
420.
[85] Lantian Shangguan, Kenny Chour, Woo Hyun Ko, Jaewon Kim, Gopal
Kamath, Bharadwaj Satchidanandan, Swaminathan Gopalswamy and P.
R. Kumar,, “Dynamic watermarking for cybersecurity of autonomous
vehicles,” Preprint, 2020.
[86] F. Chen, G. Mac, and N. Gupta, “Security features embedded in
computer aided design (cad) solid models for additive manufacturing,”
Materials & Design, vol. 128, pp. 182 – 194, 2017. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264127517304355
[87] S. T. Bukkapatnam, K. Afrin, D. Dave, and S. R. Kumara, “Machine
learning and ai for long-term fault prognosis in complex manufacturing
systems,” CIRP Annals, vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 459 – 462, 2019.
[88] H. Yang, S. Kumara, S. T. Bukkapatnam, and F. Tsung, “The internet of
things for smart manufacturing: A review,” IISE Transactions, vol. 51,
no. 11, pp. 1190–1216, 2019.
[89] X. Liu, C. Qian, W. G. Hatcher, H. Xu, W. Liao, and W. Yu, “Se-
cure internet of things (iot)-based smart-world critical infrastructures:
Survey, case study and research opportunities,” IEEE Access, Jul. 2019.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 17
[90] A. O. Akmandor, H. Yin, and N. K. Jha, “Smart, secure, yet energy-
efficient, internet-of-things sensors,” IEEE Trans. on Multi-Scale Com-
puting Systems, Oct.-Dec. 2018.
[91] D. Kumar, K. Shen, B. Case, D. Garg, D. Kuznetsov, R. Gupta, and
Z. Durumeric, “All things considered: An analysis of iot devices on
home networks,” USENIX Security Symposium, 2019.
[92] A. Sivanathan, D. Sherratt, H. H. Gharakheili, A. Radford, C. Wi-
jenayake, A. Vishwanath, and V. Sivaraman, “Characterizing and
classifying iot traffic in smart cities and campuses,” 2017 IEEE Confer-
ence on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS),
2017.
[93] Z. Zheng and A. L. N. Reddy, “Safeguarding building automation
networks: The-driven anomaly detector based on traffic analysis,” IEEE
ICCCN (Invited Paper), July 2017.
[94] Z. Zheng, S. Jin, R. Bettati, and A. L. N. Reddy, “Securing cyber-
physical systems with adaptive commensurate response,” Proc. of IEEE
CNS Conference, October 2017.
[95] Z. Zheng, A. Webb, A. L. N. Reddy, and R. Bettati, “Iotaegis: A
scalable framework to secure the internet of things,” Invited Paper at
IEEE ICCCN, July 2018.
[96] E. Fernandes, A. Rahmati, K. Eykholt, and A. Prakash, “Internet of
things security research: A rehash of old ideas or new intellectual
challenges?” Proc. of IEEE Security & Privacy, 2017.
[97] A. Alrawais, A. Alhothaily, C. Hu, and X. Cheng, “Fog computing
for the internet of things: Security and privacy issues,” IEEE Internet
Computing, Mar.-Apr. 2017.
[98] H. Ghadeer, “Cybersecurity issues in internet of things and counter-
measures,” IEEE Int. Conf. on Industrial Internet (ICII), 2018.
[99] F. Dang, Z. Li, Y. Liu, E. Zhai, Q. A. Chen, T. Xu, Y. Chen, and
J. Yang, “Understanding fileless attacks on linux-based iot devices with
honeycloud,” ACM MobiSys, 2019.
[100] F. Loi, A. Sivanathan, H. H. Gharakheili, A. Radford, and V. Sivara-
man, “Systematically evaluating security and privacy forconsumer iot
devices,” Proc. of ACM IoT S&P, 2017.
[101] P. Ducklin, “Mirai internet of things malware from krebs ddos attack
goes open source,” Naked Security by Sophos, Oct. 2016.
[102] CERT, “Vulnerability notes database,” https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/,
2020.
[103] NIST, “National vulnerability database,” https://nvd.nist.gov/, 2020.
Priyanka Mahesh is a Graduate student at New
York University. She obtained her B.Tech degree in
Computer Science from SRM University. She has
worked in the consulting industry in the field of
cybersecurity on projects related to telematics and
ICS security. Her research is focused on addressing
security concerns in cyber-physical systems, embed-
ded systems and industrial control systems in order
to build trustworthy IOT systems.
Akash Tiwari received the B.Tech. degree in indus-
trial and systems engineering from the Indian Insti-
tute of Technology (IIT) Kharagpur, India, in 2019.
He is currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree with the
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering,
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA.
He was a Summer Intern with the Royal Enfield
Motors Factory, Chennai, India, in 2017. In 2018,
he was a Summer Research Intern with the Durham
Univeristy Business School, Durham, U.K.
Chenglu Jin is a research assistant professor at
NYU Center for Cybersecurity and Center for Urban
Science and Progress. His research interest is cyber-
physical system security, hardware security, and ap-
plied cryptography. He holds a Ph.D. degree from
the University of Connecticut.
P.R. Kumar (F88) received the B.Tech. degree
in electronics engineering from Indian Institute of
Technology (IIT) Madras, Chennai, India, in 1973,
and the D.Sc. degree in systems science and math-
ematics from Washington University in St. Louis,
St. Louis, MO, USA, in 1977. He is currently
with Texas A&M University, College Station, TX,
USA. He was a faculty member with the Uni-
versity of Maryland, Baltimore County (19771984)
and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
(19852011). He was the Leader of the Guest Chair
Professor Group on Wireless Communication and Networking with Tsinghua
University. He is a D. J. Gandhi Distinguished Visiting Professor with
IIT Bombay, and an Honorary Professor with IIT Hyderabad. His research
interests include cyber-physical systems, cybersecurity, privacy, wireless net-
works, renewable energy, smart grid, autonomous vehicles, and unmanned air
vehicle systems. Prof. Kumar is a member of the U.S. National Academy
of Engineering, The World Academy of Sciences, and the Indian National
Academy of Engineering. He was awarded a Doctor Honoris Causa by ETH
Zurich. He was the recipient of the IEEE Field Award for Control Systems,
the Donald P. Eckman Award of the AACC, Fred W. Ellersick Prize of the
IEEE Communications Society, the Outstanding Contribution Award of ACM
SIGMOBILE, the INFOCOM Achievement Award, and the SIGMOBILE
Test-of-Time Paper Award. He is a Fellow ACM. He was also the recipient of
the Distinguished Alumnus Award from IIT Madras, the Alumni Achievement
Award from Washington University in St. Louis, and the Daniel Drucker
Eminent Faculty Award from the College of Engineering, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign.
Narasimha Reddy is currently a J.W. Runyon Pro-
fessor in the department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering at Texas A&M University as well as the
Associate Dean for Research with the Texas A&M
Engineering Program and the Assistant Director
of Strategic Initiatives & Centers with the Texas
A&M Engineering Experiment Station. Reddys re-
search interests are in Computer Networks, Storage
Systems, and Computer Architecture. During 1990-
1995, he was a Research Staff Member at IBM
Almaden Research Center in San Jose. Reddy holds
five patents and was awarded a technical accomplishment award while at IBM.
He received an NSF Career Award in 1996. His honors include an Outstanding
Professor award by the IEEE student branch at Texas A&M during 1997-
1998, an Outstanding Faculty award by the Department of Electrical and
Computer Engineering during 2003-2004, a Distinguished Achievement award
for teaching from the Former Students Association of Texas A&M University,
and a citation for one of the most influential papers from the 1st ACM
Multimedia Conference.
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Satish T.S. Bukkapatnam received his Ph.D. and
M.S. degrees in industrial and manufacturing engi-
neering from the Pennsylvania State University. He
currently serves as Rockwell International Profes-
sor with the Department of Industrial and Systems
Engineering department at Texas A&M University,
College Station, TX, USA, and has been selected
as a Fulbright-Tocqueville distinguished chair. He is
also the Director of Texas A&M Engineering Exper-
imentation Station (TEES) Institute for Manufactur-
ing Systems. His research in smart manufacturing
addresses the harnessing of high-resolution nonlinear dynamic information,
especially from wireless MEMS sensors, to improve the monitoring and
prognostics, mainly of ultra-precision and nano-manufacturing processes and
machines, and wearable sensors for cardio-respiratory processes. His research
has led to over 160 articles in journals and conference proceedings. He is a
fellow of the Institute for Industrial and Systems Engineers (IISE), and the
Society of Manufacturing Engineers (SME).
Nikhil Gupta is a Professor of Mechanical and
Aerospace Engineering at New York University. He
is also affiliated with NYU Center for Cybersecurity.
His research is focused on developing methods to
secure computer aided design files against theft of
intellectual property and unauthorized production of
parts. His group is also using machine learning meth-
ods for reverse engineering of parts and mechanical
property characterization. He is an author of over
195 journal articles and book chapters on composite
materials, materials characterization methods and
additive manufacturing security.
Ramesh Karri (F’20) is a Professor of
Electrical and Computer Engineering at New
York University. He co-directs the NYU Center
for Cyber Security (http://cyber.nyu.edu). He
co-founded the Trust-Hub (http://trust-hub.org)
and organizes the Embedded Systems Challenge
(https://csaw.engineering.nyu.edu/esc), the annual
red team blue team event. Ramesh Karri has a
Ph.D. in Computer Science and Engineering, from
the University of California at San Diego and a
B.E in ECE from Andhra University. His research
and education activities in hardware cybersecurity include trustworthy
integrated circuits, processors and cyber-physical systems; security-aware
computer-aided design, test, verification, validation, and reliability; nano
meets security; hardware security competitions, benchmarks, and metrics;
biochip security; additive manufacturing security. He has published over
275 articles in leading journals and conference proceedings. His work in
trustworthy hardware received best paper award nominations (ICCD 2015
and DFTS 2015), awards (ACM TODAES 2017, ITC 2014, CCS 2013,
DFTS 2013 and VLSI Design 2012, ACM Student Research Competition
at DAC 2012, ICCAD 2013, DAC 2014, ACM Grand Finals 2013,
Kaspersky Challenge and Embedded Security Challenge). He received
the Humboldt Fellowship and the National Science Foundation CAREER
Award. He is a Fellow of the IEEE for his contributions to and leadership
in Trustworthy Hardware. He is the Editor-in-Chief of ACM Journal of
Emerging Technologies in Computing. Besides, he served/s as the Associate
Editor of IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, IEEE
Transactions on CAD, ACM Journal of Emerging Computing Technologies,
ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems (2014-),
IEEE Access, IEEE Transactions on Emerging Technologies in Computing,
IEEE Design and Test (2015-) and IEEE Embedded Systems Letters (2016-).
He served as an IEEE Computer Society Distinguished Visitor (2013-2015).
He served on the Executive Committee of the IEEE/ACM Design Automation
Conference leading the Security@DAC initiative (2014-2017). He has given
keynotes, talks, and tutorials on Hardware Security and Trust.
